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Abstract 
 
In the early 1990s the World Bank launched the Regional Program on Enterprise 
Development in several African countries, a key component of which was to collect 
data on manufacturing firms. The data sets built by these and subsequent enterprise 
surveys in Africa generated considerable research. This article surveys the research 
on the African business environment, focusing on risk, access to credit, labor, and 
infrastructure, and on how firms organize themselves and do business. It reviews the 
research on enterprise performance, including enterprise growth, investment, and 
exports. The article concludes with a discussion of policy lessons. 
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The idea that better private sector performance in Africa can reduce poverty remains 
central in policy discussions. Even though the performance of Africa’s manufacturing 
sector has generally been quite poor over the last 10–15 years (Mauritius is a 
conspicuous exception), many people still believe that manufacturing can act as an 
engine of growth on the continent, by creating skilled jobs and positive spillover 
effects and, more generally, by modernizing the economy. In the early 1990s, to get a 
better idea of why things were going wrong in the manufacturing sector and how to 
improve them, the World Bank fielded extensive data collection projects in many 
African countries. Such data collection has subsequently become a regular exercise in 
at least some African countries. This article reviews the findings that have emerged 
from this research, focusing primarily on research published after peer review.1  
The results reported in this survey are thus based firm survey data, and we 
argue that the availability of such data has greatly improved our understanding of 
Africa’s manufacturing sector. Certain research questions cannot be answered by 
relying on aggregate data. It may be that the researcher has to analyze differences 
across firms within an economy, in order to estimate, say, productivity dispersion - a 
conventional indicator of the degree of competition – or to find out whether credit 
constrained firms invest less than unconstrained ones. It is arguably in cases like this, 
when the heterogeneity across firms is of central interest, that firm data are most 
useful.The more heterogeneity, the more pertinent are questions relating to the causes 
and consequences of such differences across firms, and the more pressing the need for 
enterprise data. Panel data, which follow the same firms over time, are especially 
powerful in this context, because they permit drawing stronger conclusions about 
causal effects, since time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity can be controlled for. As 
we shall see below, panel data also provide a good basis for analyzing firm dynamics, 
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for example, productivity growth and firm survival. One of the recurring themes of 
this article is that enterprise data indicate substantial heterogeneity in choices and 
outcomes across firms within countries in Africa.2 Indeed, while most African firms 
have not fared well during the last decade, some have performed extremely well.  
  
In recent years there has been a rapidly growing interest in documenting 
differences in the investment climate across regions and countries and investigating 
whether such differences can be linked to differences in outcomes across and within 
countries (for example, Batra, Kaufmann and Stone 2003; World Bank 2004, 2005).3 
Survey data have played a key role in this context. It is often argued that the poor 
investment climate in Africa results in high transaction costs and particularly 
disadvantages the manufacturing sector and its ability to export, because 
manufacturers are intensive users of investment climate services (Collier 2000). This 
is problematic because exporting may present a promising route to growth and 
development in Africa. Domestic markets for manufactured goods are typically very 
small, so if African industry is to grow, generate new jobs, and contribute to poverty 
reduction, a substantial share of its output needs to be oriented toward exports. There 
is also evidence from the survey data that firms become more productive as a result of 
exporting. This is the so-called learning by exporting effect, first documented for 
Africa by Bigsten and others (2004) and subsequently confirmed on a larger sample 
by van Biesebroeck (2005a). This is discussed in more detail below. 
The following section briefly describes the main data collection projects that 
have been fielded in Africa since the early 1990s and comments on the quality of the 
data. The article then reviews the research results on manufacturing firms in Africa, 
looking first at the business environment, especially at risk, access to credit, labor and 
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skills, and infrastructure. It turns next to how firms that operate in such an investment 
climate organize themselves and how firms do business. It looks in some detail at 
what has been learned about three key aspects of firm performance: growth, 
investment and technology acquisition, and exports. The final section presents some 
lessons. 
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African Enterprise Survey Data 
In the last 10–15 years five major research programs have collected survey data on 
African enterprises on a large scale. The first was the Regional Program on Enterprise 
Development (RPED), which carried out surveys in Burundi, Cameroon, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe between 1992 and 1995. 
Each survey typically covered about 200 firms, and the same firms were surveyed 
three years in a row in most countries, thus yielding panel data. The surveys covered 
large and small firms, including informal firms, in the food, wood, textiles, and metal 
industries. Data were collected on a wide range of variables, including sales and 
output, capital stock, entrepreneur characteristics, employment by occupational 
category, labor turnover, wages, and management-worker conflict.  
Data collection as part of the RPED slowed for a while after 1995. The World Bank 
subsequently initiated the Firm Analysis and Competitiveness Surveys (FACS), a 
large data collection program oriented toward larger firms outside Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Morocco was the only African country surveyed. However, at the end of the 
1990s and in the early 2000s new survey initiatives took place in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
as Investment Climate Surveys and the World Business Environment Survey were 
fielded across a wide range of countries. The Investment Climate Surveys carried out 
so far in Sub-Saharan Africa have covered Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
These surveys were similar to the earlier RPED surveys in firm and sector coverage, 
but the survey instruments were oriented more toward investment climate issues, such 
as governance, regulations, economic policy, and public services. The WBES was 
launched in 80 countries and one territory in 1999 and 2000, including 17 countries in 
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Sub-Saharan Africa (Batra, Kaufmann and Stone 2003). The surveys in Sub-Saharan 
Africa covered 52–137 firms per country and included both manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing firms.  
Another research program involving enterprise surveys was implemented by 
the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) at Oxford University. These 
surveys followed up on the RPED surveys in Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania and have 
extended the panel data. 4 The panel data from the early RPED surveys include at 
most three observations per firm. The CSAE surveys have made some of these panels 
much longer. In the case of Ghana, for instance, the time series dimension of the panel 
is currently twelve years. 
The data sets generated by these surveys constitute the most comprehensive 
source of information on African manufacturing firms available. Still, several 
limitations need to be borne in mind when interpreting the results of the research 
based on these data. First, because large firms are typically oversampled, the samples 
generated by these surveys are generally not representative of the population of firms. 
And because sampling weights are typically either not available or are based on 
outdated registers of firms (Van Biesebroeck 2005b), results based on the survey data 
may not generalize beyond the samples. Second, most results pertain to four industrial 
sectors (food, wood, textiles, and metal), and it is not clear whether the findings 
would apply to other sectors. Third, the quality of the data is not perfect. The financial 
data are likely to be particularly noisy. Consider the capital stock data, for example. 
Firms report the replacement value of plant and machinery, and sometimes they are 
asked to do this every year. Information on investment is also collected, so with two 
data points on capital and one on investment, the capital stock in period two should be 
approximately equal to the capital stock in period one (perhaps adjusted for 
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depreciation) plus investment. In practice, however, there are sometimes large 
differences between the reported value of the capital stock and the value implied by 
last year’s value plus investment. Measurement errors in the data may lead to serious 
biases. 
 
What Have We Learned?  
 
This section looks at the business environment in which African manufacturing firms 
operate and then examines three key aspects of firm performance: growth, investment, 
and exports.  
 
The Business Environment 
 
The business environment has emerged as the prime suspect for poor enterprise 
performance in Africa. Improving the investment climate is seen as a policy priority 
for the continent (World Bank 2004, 2005).5 Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone (2003) 
analyze the obstacles to business based on the WBES data. The leading constraint 
cited by enterprise managers in Africa is financing, followed by corruption, 
infrastructure, and inflation. Pooling data across all regions, the researchers find a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between taxes, regulations, and 
financing, and the growth in sales and investment. Quantitatively, the largest effect is 
that of financing constraints on sales growth. Over a three-year period average sales 
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growth is 4.6 percentage points lower for a firm identifying itself as financially 
constrained than for an unconstrained firm, everything else equal.  
What can be inferred from these results? First, given the nature of the 
explanatory variables, it is important to distinguish between correlation and causality. 
There is almost certainly some bias caused by omitted variables or reverse causation. 
Financing, in particular, seems very likely to be endogenous: firms that perform badly 
and grow slowly will have difficulty getting financing. Batra, Kaufmann, and Stone 
(2003, p. 71) acknowledge this and recommend interpreting the results as “empirical 
associations” rather than causal effects. Second, even if viewed as causal effects, the 
quantitative significance of the business environment effects is rather small compared 
with the substantial variation in growth rates across firms in this data set. Third, the 
inclusion of country fixed effects makes the parameter estimates robust to omitted 
variables that vary across,  but not within, countries . This could well be important. 
The fixed effects approach also implies the need for caution when comparing cross-
country differences. The results are best interpreted as showing that a good local 
investment climate is good for local business performance. The results do not show 
whether firms in countries with poor average business conditions have lower or higher 
average growth rates of sales and investment than firms in countries with good 
average conditions.  
One implication of a poor business environment is that the costs for certain 
services important to manufacturers will be high. Eifert, Gelb, and Ramachandran 
(2005) show that African firms have high indirect costs (transport, logistics, 
telecommunications, water, electricity, land and buildings, marketing, accounting, 
security, bribes) compared with firms in Asia and that African firms suffer substantial 
losses from power outages, crime, shipment losses, and the like. Further, economic 
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risk in Africa is typically high, credit is expensive or unavailable, skilled labor is 
relatively expensive, and domestic markets are typically very small. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that these factors present significant problems for 
manufacturers in Africa. What do the enterprise data show about these characteristics 
of the business environment? 
 
Risk. Entrepreneurs in Africa face considerable uncertainty with regard to prices 
(including foreign exchange), demand, customer payment, reliability of infrastructure, 
and corruption. Investigating the effects of risk empirically is difficult, however, since 
risk is not easily measured. In macroeconomic analysis, this is commonly done by 
using some measure of volatility in demand or the exchange rate. Gunning and 
Mengistae (2001) point out that this may be misleading, however, since the standard 
deviation of the exchange rate may not capture the credibility of the government’s 
exchange rate policy. The African enterprise surveys, however, have included 
questions about expectations for macroeconomic variables (inflation, interest rates, 
exchange rate) and enterprise variables (employment, output). Questions were asked, 
for example, about expectations about the extent of depreciation in the exchange rate 
during the next 12 months.  
Such data have enabled researchers to get a much better understanding of the 
effects of perceived risk. Using data on Ghanaian manufacturing firms, Pattillo and 
Söderbom (2001) find that firms that face considerable uncertainty about future 
demand tend to have lower profit rates than firms facing less uncertainty. The 
researchers argue that high risk makes firms choose a conservative product mix, with 
a lower expected profit rate.  
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Fafchamps, Gunning, and Oostendorp (2000) show that Zimbabwean firms 
respond to risk by increasing their inventories, another example of how risk leads to 
conservative behavior and additional costs. The most commonly cited effect of risk, 
however, is on investment. Gunning and Mengistae (2001) conclude from their 
review of the evidence that investments in African manufacturing have been held 
back by high risk rather than low returns on investments. This is discussed further 
below. 
 
Access to credit. Bigsten and others (2003) look at formal credit market participation 
and credit constraints based on 1991–95 survey data on firms in Burundi, Cameroon, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. The researchers use data on firms’ 
demand for external funds and on whether loan applications were approved. Summary 
data on the frequency of loan applications and outcomes suggest that demand for 
formal loans among African manufacturers is low: less than 20 percent of the firms in 
the sample had applied for a formal loan in the year prior to the survey (table 1). 
Among those applying, the majority of firms obtained loans, but there are large 
differences by firm size. Loan applications are less common among small firms, and 
the success rate is lower than among larger firms.  
{Table 1 about here} 
Of course, a firm may be credit constrained even if it does not apply for a loan. 
A firm may expect an application to fail precisely because there are credit constraints 
and may therefore decide to avoid the transaction costs and not apply. Based on 
information on why firms did not apply for a loan, Bigsten and others (2003) identify 
three groups of firms: those without credit demand and, among those with credit 
demand, constrained and unconstrained firms. Of the firms in their sample, 55 percent 
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have no credit demand, 33 percent are credit constrained, and 12 percent are 
unconstrained (table 2). The differences are large across firms of different sizes. Close 
to two-thirds of the micro firms appear constrained, but only 10 percent of the large 
firms. About two-thirds of the large firms choose not to participate in the credit 
market compared with only a third of the micro firms. That the smallest firms are 
credit constrained is supported by regression results indicating that, controlling for 
other important factors such as expected profitability and indebtedness, the likelihood 
of a successful loan application varies with firm size. While this suggests that banks 
are biased against small firms, the researchers note that this result may reflect banks’ 
transaction costs. In any case, the size effect is substantial: for a micro firm to have 
the same chance of getting a loan as a large firm, the micro firm needs to have an 
average return on fixed capital more than 200 percentage points higher than the large 
firm. 
{Table 2 about here} 
In another study analyzing the links between formal credit and company 
investment, Habyarimana (2003) uses matched bank-firm data from Uganda to 
estimate the effect on firm performance of losing a banking relationship. Four 
Ugandan banks were closed between September 1998 and  May 1999 because of 
imprudent banking practices. As a result, 30 percent of the firms in the sample lost 
one or several banking relationships. Habyarimana estimates that over the three years 
following the banking crisis, the average annual growth rate of employment among 
firms that lost a banking relationship was 2.3–4 percent lower than the average annual 
growth rate of unaffected firms, controlling for firm fixed effects and sector-specific 
time effects. Further, firms affected by the banking crises are more likely to report 
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being credit constrained, suggesting that losing a banking relationship hampers 
investment.  
 
Labor and skills. Labor costs and the supply of labor in general and specific skills in 
particular are important for firm performance. Two general results in this area have 
emerged from the research on the African survey data, one related to earnings and 
education, and one to earnings and firm size. The first is that earnings are positively 
correlated with education. Jones (2001) uses matched employer-employee data from 
Ghana to see whether wage differentials between workers with different levels of 
education reflect genuine productivity differentials. She estimates a productivity 
equation and an earnings equation and investigates whether the coefficients on 
education in the two equations are consistent with the hypothesis that earnings 
differentials reflect productivity differentials—whether the marginal product of labor 
is equal to the wage for given levels of education. In both equations the estimated 
coefficient on education is close to 0.07, and there is no statistically significant 
difference between the relative wages paid to workers and their relative productivity 
levels. This result, which appears robust to alternative specifications, supports the 
notion that education raises productivity.  
Jones (2001) assumes that the return to education is constant. Söderbom and 
others (2006) relax this assumption and investigate whether the return to education 
varies across different levels of education in Kenya and Tanzania during 1993–2001. 
It is often argued that the earnings function is concave in education, implying that the 
marginal return to education decreases with the level of education (for example, 
Psacharopoulos 1994; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2002). The results reported by 
Söderbom and others (2006), however, indicate that the earnings function is convex, 
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so that the marginal returns to education are lowest for individuals with the least 
education. This result is robust to endogeneity of education. One implication is that 
giving priority to investment in primary education may have little impact on poverty 
unless those affected proceed to higher levels of education. The researchers speculate 
that the convexity may be part of the explanation for why the rapid expansion of 
education in Africa has generated so little growth. 
The second general result that has emerged from the research on enterprise 
data and labor is that wages differ significantly across different size firms, even when 
comparing workers with similar levels of human capital. In an early study 
documenting this, Velenchik (1997), using manufacturing data from Zimbabwe 
collected in 1993, estimates a wage-size elasticity of 0.26 for the sample of 1,609 
observations. This indicates a very high size-wage gap. For instance, it implies that 
the average wage in a firm with 100 employees is about 80 percent higher than the 
average wage in a firm with 10 employees. The underlying regression does not 
control for other factors that might affect wages, so this result can be viewed as a 
reference point.  
Velenchik (1997) goes on to investigate whether the size-wage gap can be 
attributed to omitted variables. She considers a very wide range of observable factors, 
including experience, tenure, education, training, gender, location, industry, 
occupation, various working condition variables, unionization, ownership, 
profitability, and productivity. While the estimated wage-size elasticity falls as a 
result of controlling for these variables, it never drops below 0.10 and is always 
significantly different from zero. Thus, even conditional on this large set of 
observable variables, a quantitatively important size-wage gap remains.  
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It could be, of course, that the size-wage gap documented by Velenchik is 
driven by omitted unobserved factors. As she notes “[t]he basic labor quality 
difference argument is that larger firms hire ‘better’ workers, and therefore pay higher 
wages” (Velenchik, 1997, p. 311). If worker ability is partially unobserved, this would 
set up a correlation between size and wages. Recent evidence based on panel data 
suggests that this is not the case, however. Söderbom, Teal, and Wambugu (2005) 
show that, conditional on all observed and unobserved worker skills that are fixed 
over time, workers’ earnings in Ghana and Kenya vary positively with firm size. 
Again, the estimated effect is economically large. In the preferred specification for 
Ghana the estimated elasticity of wages with respect to firm size is 0.15; in Kenya it is 
0.08. The point estimates imply that as a firm grows from, say, having 20 employees 
to having 40, wages will increase 11 percent in Ghana and 6 percent in Kenya.6
These results suggest that earnings rise with firm growth. Since rapidly rising 
labor costs are likely to constrain firm growth, it is important to understand why this 
is observed. Underlying Velenchik’s empirical approach are a number of economic 
theories (for example, rent-sharing; see also Teal 1996), but as seen, these do not 
appear to be the whole explanation for the size-wage gap. One possibility is that, as in 
efficiency wage models, large firms pay relatively higher wages to provide workers 
with incentives to exert effort.7 Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) derive a theoretical 
model in which the size-wage relationship is generated by the rising cost of 
monitoring workers as firm size increases, and they estimate the structural parameters 
using worker-firm matched data across 10 African countries. We discuss the 
implications of their findings in the following Section. 
While it may not be entirely clear why there is a size-wage gap in the data, 
there is fairly strong evidence that the gap is not simply an artifact of omitting 
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unobserved skills from the regressions. There is also good evidence that the size-wage 
gap is quantitatively large. In the case of Ghana, for instance, Söderbom and Teal 
(2004) estimate that if a firm with 350 employees faced the same wage as a firm with 
20 employees, total costs in the large firm would fall by 20–25 percent. One 
implication of the large size-wage gap is that firm growth is associated with rising 
labor costs, which, everything else held constant, will tend to erode firms’ profits.  
So how can growing firms remain profitable? One way would be through 
improved performance in the form of higher productivity. Söderbom and Teal (2004) 
look for evidence of increasing returns to scale in Ghanaian manufacturing. Thus as 
firms grow, higher average labor costs would be offset by higher input productivity. 
Söderbom and Teal report production function estimates that are robust to unobserved 
time-invariant heterogeneity across firms (fixed effects) and endogeneity in the factor 
inputs. They find only weak evidence for increasing returns, and constant returns to 
scale is not rejected. They argue that the reason large firms can remain profitable is 
that they face lower capital costs than small firms. One possible reason is better 
access to formal credit.  
 
Infrastructure. Based on several studies of growth determinants in Africa, Collier and 
Gunning (1999) argue that poor infrastructure is a serious constraint to growth on the 
continent. Compared with other regions public expenditure as a share of GDP has 
been higher in Africa, while service provision has been worse. The poor infrastructure 
in Africa is likely to be a particularly severe constraint to manufacturing growth. 
Many firms spend their own resources directly to buy infrastructure services or 
provide it on their own. One reason for the prevalence of small manufacturing firms 
in Africa (see below) is that transport infrastructure is poorly developed, which 
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creates pockets of demand that tend to generate small-scale localized producers. To be 
able to take advantage of international trading opportunities and to engage actively in 
the emerging system of outsourcing, reliable and cheap infrastructure is required. 
Poor infrastructure thus presents a significant problem for exporters. 
The firm surveys have generated information about how firms perceive 
infrastructure problems and recently also about the time and monetary costs of 
different bottlenecks. Bigsten and others (1999a) show that attempts to use data on 
perceptions to explain productivity is problematic, however. Firms that rank 
infrastructure problems as very severe are the most productive ones, arguably because 
these firms sell on larger markets and are therefore more dependent on infrastructure. 
The use of objective measures (for example, days in customs, days without telephone 
connections, days without electricity) is a more promising approach, but so far little 
analysis is available on the impact of infrastructure on manufacturing firm 
productivity.8
 
Enterprise Organization and the Business Environment 
 
Enterprise organization. A conspicuous characteristic of Africa’s manufacturing 
sector is the preponderance of very small and informal firms, which operate side by 
side with a small number of large-scale factories. The impact on the efficiency of 
resource allocation is pertinent. Bigsten, Kimuyu, and Lundvall (2004) investigate 
whether there are productivity differentials between formal and informal firms in 
Kenya, where the bulk of manufacturing employment is in the informal sector. Using 
a production function approach, these researchers find no significant productivity 
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difference between small informal and small formal African-owned firms. A 
reallocation of firms from the informal to the formal sector would thus not necessarily 
affect aggregate productivity. Nevertheless, there is little investment and little 
exporting in the informal sector, and so growth in this sector is unlikely to be a source 
of significant modernization. Further, wages in the informal sector are low, and 
contributions to tax revenues miniscule. There is therefore a case for policies to 
encourage the formalization of informal firms.  
In view of this need, why small informal firms do not grow is an important 
question. Bigsten, Kimuyu, and Lundvall (2004) note that formal firms in Kenya have 
experienced significant problems in dealing with the authorities relating to corruption, 
regulatory red tape, and lack of security. In a similar vein Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 
(2002) report that the proportion of firms that perceive regulations as an obstacle to 
growth is lower in the informal than in the formal manufacturing sector in Côte 
d’Ivoire (the opposite is true for market conditions). With cost increases and no 
productivity gains from becoming formal, it may thus be rational for African 
entrepreneurs to choose to start or remain informal. To see a shift in the size 
distribution from small to medium-size and large firms, the incentives probably need 
to change. This topic is discussed again later. 
Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) offer a different perspective on organization, 
using a principal-agent framework to analyze the consequences of inadequate 
incentives for workers. A key assumption in their model is that the costs of 
monitoring workers rise with firm size. As a result of losing control of workers as 
firm size increases, firms need to motivate workers by raising their wages instead. 
The theoretical model consists of a system of equations in which the wages of 
supervisors and workers are determined simultaneously with the number of 
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supervisors and workers employed by the firm. That is, both firm size and wages are 
treated as endogenous variables. Estimates of the parameters of the structural model 
indicate that a doubling in the number of production workers will increase the labor 
cost per unit of effort by 9 percent for Morocco and 11–14 percent for Sub-Saharan 
Africa—the penalty large firms incur to motivate workers. Thus the incentive problem 
appears to be more severe in Sub-Saharan Africa than in Morocco.  
Fafchamps and Söderbom (2006) further find that an increase in total factor 
productivity leads to an increase in worker effort in Morocco but a decrease in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Firms in Sub-Saharan Africa with high total factor productivity hire 
fewer workers and supervisors (and produce less output) than they would have done 
had the incentive structure been similar to that in Morocco. Quantitatively, this effect 
on output is large: a 1 percent increase in total factor productivity raises output 2.9 
percent in Morocco but only 1.3 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. If Fafchamps and 
Söderbom are right in arguing that this is because a firm with high total factor 
productivity finds it more difficult in Sub-Saharan Africa than in Morocco to manage 
and supervise its labor force, the implications for firm growth are potentially quite 
significant. 
 
Business environment. The business environment also affects how firms do business. 
Widespread market failures imply that firms face many “holes” in important markets, 
such as those for insurance and credit. This is especially pronounced for the smallest 
firms. Fafchamps (2001) identifies two types of responses that aim to reduce the 
resulting transaction costs: developing relationships and sharing information within 
networks. Essentially, when search and verification costs are high, it makes sense to 
establish long-term relationships and share information with other market participants 
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in order to economize on such costs. The enterprise data have been extensively used 
to shed light on these mechanisms. 
Trade credit is a good example of how supplier relationships can fill in some 
of the holes in the formal credit market. Fisman (2001) argues that trade credit plays 
an important role in enterprise financing in Africa, mainly by enabling firms to 
manage raw material inventories more efficiently and by reducing the likelihood of 
raw material shortages. Trade credit may therefore contribute to higher productive 
efficiency. Fisman analyzes these issues using the first wave of RPED data from Côte 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Trade credit is the dominant form 
of payment to suppliers for about a third of the firms. There is much variation across 
countries, however. Trade credit is the dominant form of payment for 8 percent of 
firms in Tanzania, but for 69 percent in Zimbabwe. Trade credit appears to be more 
important in countries where the average firm size is larger, suggesting that large 
firms are more likely to use trade credit than small ones. In the formal empirical 
analysis Fisman finds that firms that use supplier credit have significantly higher 
capacity utilization than firms that do not and are less likely to have raw material 
stockouts. Further, he finds that these results are particularly strong among firms that 
are constrained in their access to formal credit. These results are robust to the 
potential endogeneity of supplier credit, which may arise if firms use trade credit 
because they have high capacity utilization or substantial inventories, for instance.  
Fisman (2001) suggests that these results imply the possibility of substantial 
productivity gains from an increase in the availability of supplier credit. He also 
makes the point, however, that without understanding why some firms have access to 
credit while others do not, it will be difficult to provide solid advice to policymakers. 
If lack of access to trade credit is driven by market failures—perhaps lack of public 
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information on creditworthiness or poor contract enforcement—policy measures to fix 
these problems would probably have the desired results; but if firms do not get trade 
credit because they are unreliable, pose a big credit risk, or do not want trade credit, 
then it is not clear that improving access should be a policy priority.  
Fisman and Raturi (2004) investigate whether various firm and entrepreneurial 
characteristics affect the likelihood that firms in Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe get trade credit. The main focus of this analysis is to see whether trade 
credit is more common among firms that purchase inputs from suppliers that face 
considerable competition. The researchers find this to be the case and interpret this 
finding as evidence that suppliers operating in a competitive market use credit to 
create buyer loyalty. Fisman and Raturi argue that this is consistent with a situation in 
which firms that want trade credit must establish creditworthiness and, because of 
information imperfections, must do so every time they switch suppliers. This form of 
market failure creates rents for suppliers and increases costs for manufacturers.9 A 
related result, documented by Fafchamps (2000), is that Asian and European 
entrepreneurs have better access to trade credit than African entrepreneurs. His 
hypothesis is that this is due to ethnic networking in contract enforcement.  
There is still no complete picture of why African firms get trade credit, this 
research suggests that strengthening credit market institutions may be important. In 
the specific context considered by Fisman and Raturi (2004), the policy implication is 
that establishing efficient credit rating agencies that keep a record of companies’ 
credit histories would erode the de facto monopoly power of suppliers and reduce 
costs for manufacturers. 
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Enterprise Growth 
 
From a policy point of view a good understanding of the relationships between 
growth and certain enterprise characteristics is important, since it can offer guidance 
to policymakers about what types of firms are likely to be more successful and better 
at creating jobs in the future. The relationship between enterprise size and growth is 
of particular interest for the African manufacturing sector, since most firms in Africa 
are very small. How realistic is it to hope that some of these firms will grow and 
become successful large firms? The relationship between firm age and growth is also 
important. For example, if young firms grow quickly, policy measures aimed at 
encouraging entry may have significant growth effects in the short and medium term. 
A common way of investigating the relationships between growth on the one 
hand and size and age on the other is to run regressions of the growth rate of 
employment between two periods on the explanatory variables employment and age 
in the initial period. Several such studies have found a negative relationship between 
size and growth (for example, Ramachandran and Shah 1999 and Mazumdar and 
Mazaheri 2003).  
Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys (2002) argue that such regressions may be too 
restrictive by not allowing for nonlinear relationships. When these researchers 
augment the basic growth model with terms nonlinear in size and age, they find strong 
evidence of a positive effect on growth of the interaction between age and size. 
Everything else equal, the relationship between age and growth is less negative (or 
more positive) for large firms than for small firms, and the relationship between size 
and growth is less negative (or more positive) for old firms than for young ones. Thus, 
 20
a firm that is small when it enters the market grows relatively fast initially, but growth 
rates slows over time and eventually the firm may start to contract. For a large firm 
entering the market, the pattern is the opposite. Growth rates are low initially—in fact, 
employment may fall rapidly in the initial years of operation—but eventually the 
favorable age effect (driven by the positive interaction effect between size and age) 
kicks in, and growth rates increase. The implication of the results is that small and 
large firms have very different growth patterns: high growth tends to be observed 
mostly among the small and young firms and the large and old firms. These results 
square with descriptive statistics indicating that few small firms ever grow up to 
become large (Biggs, Ramachandran, and Shah 1999, cited in Biggs and Shah 2003).  
While interesting, these results should probably be interpreted with a dose of 
caution because it is possible that the estimated correlation between size and growth is 
spurious. The problem, dubbed “the Regression Fallacy” by Davis, Haltiwanger, and 
Schuh (1996), arises whenever there are transitory fluctuations in size or transitory 
measurement errors in observed size. The resulting bias in the estimated relationship 
between initial size and growth is negative, so failure to address this problem can 
produce a picture of the growth of small firms that is too good. The researchers 
propose that one way of dealing with the problem is to use average size over the 
observed period rather than initial size as the measure of enterprise size. Adopting this 
procedure, Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2003) present descriptive statistics indicating at 
most a weak negative relationship between size and growth in Cameroon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
Enterprise characteristics other than size and age have been shown to matter 
for growth as well. Ramachandran and Shah (1999) find that firms in Kenya, 
Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe that are controlled by minority entrepreneurs 
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(Asian or European) did better than those controlled by indigenous entrepreneurs.10 
The coefficients on secondary and university education are highly significant and 
positive for African entrepreneurs, while none of the entrepreneurial variables was 
significant in the non-African model. The researchers hypothesize that non-Africans 
benefit from various advantages of being a minority, such as access to informal 
networks, credit, and informal contractual mechanisms, and that for African 
entrepreneurs education may substitute for access to networks. Mengistae (1999) uses 
data for Ethiopian manufacturing firms to show that there also are significant 
differences between indigenous ethnic groups in terms of entrepreneurial success. 
Related to firm growth is firm survival. Exit rates in African manufacturing are high, 
and they are highest among the smallest firms. Frazer (2005) documents strong 
empirical evidence of a positive association between productivity and the likelihood 
of firm survival among Ghanaian manufacturing firms. The results imply that a one 
standard deviation increase in total factor productivity is associated with a 1.8 
percentage point fall in the likelihood of firm exit over the subsequent two-year 
period, a reasonably large effect considering that the average exit rate is 6.3 percent. 
A related study by Söderbom, Teal, and Harding (2006) based on pooled panel data 
on firms in Ghana, Kenya, and Tanzania over a five-year period finds that total factor 
productivity affects firm survival among large firms but not small ones. In other 
words, being relatively more productive does not prevent firms from going out of 
business if they are small. Among larger firms, however, exit rates do depend on 
productivity, which is consistent with a survival of the fittest process, as documented 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and a number of middle-income countries. 
This result is also consistent with the findings reported by Frazer (2005). 
 
 22
Investment  
 
This section reviews the empirical literature on investment in Africa’s manufacturing 
sector, focusing on financial constraints and risk.11 African financial markets are the 
least developed in the world, and development economists have long held the view 
that this impedes growth. For investment the main problem is that firms with 
profitable investment projects often cannot use external funds to finance such 
projects.  
That there are financial imperfections in Africa can hardly be disputed, but 
such imperfections translate into binding constraints only if firms have a desire to 
invest. Bigsten and others (1999b) is one of the first studies analyzing whether 
investment among African firms is hampered by lack of external finance. That study 
follows a fairly conventional approach in the empirical investment literature, testing 
whether investment is sensitive to changes in cash flow among firms observed in the 
early and mid-1990s in Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. The evidence 
indicates that there is a statistically significant profit effect on investment, which 
suggests the presence of credit constraints. With point estimates on the profit term 
ranging between 0.06 and 0.10, the magnitude of the effect is small, however: only 
between $0.06 and $0.10 cents of an additional $1 earned in profits are invested. 
{Table 3 about here} 
Subsequent research based on RPED data confirms that investment is not 
particularly sensitive to changes in profits. In an in-depth analysis of the 
manufacturing sector in Zimbabwe 1992–94, Fafchamps and Oostendorp (1999) show 
that the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is low, even among small firms. 
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Söderbom (2002) obtains a similar result for Kenya. Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2003) 
use a sample of six countries (adding Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia to the set of countries 
considered by Bigsten and others 1999b) and report an estimated profit coefficient of 
0.08, which is very similar to that of Bigsten and others (1999b). Mazumdar and 
Mazaheri also split the sample by firm size and obtain a profit coefficient of 0.09 in 
the subsample of small firms. They interpret the larger profit coefficient among small 
firms as evidence of greater credit constraints among small firms than large ones, 
which seems likely. Reinikka and Svensson (2001) obtain a profit coefficient of 0.08 
based on a sample of Ugandan manufacturing firms for 1996–97. These researchers 
too find a larger profit effect among smaller firms, which is consistent with the notion 
that credit access is more of a problem for small firms. However, the point estimate of 
the coefficient on profits among small firms is 0.11, and so quantitatively the effect is 
not particularly large even for small firms.  
The second-hand market for used machinery in Africa is shallow at best, and 
so investment expenditures are often “sunk” (investment is irreversible). Theories of 
irreversible investment under uncertainty predict that investment will be slower to 
respond to demand shocks if uncertainty is high. As mentioned, testing empirically for 
the effects of risk is difficult, as risk is not easily measured. The design of innovative 
survey questions has been a major step forward. Pattillo (1998) uses panel data on 
Ghanaian manufacturing firms from 1994 and 1995 to test hypotheses from models of 
irreversible investment under uncertainty. Based on data on entrepreneurs’ subjective 
(or perceived) probability distribution over future demand, Pattillo calculates the 
variance of demand and uses this as the measure of uncertainty. Empirical results 
indicate that uncertainty has a negative effect on investment, an effect that is more 
pronounced for firms with more irreversible investment. Darku (2001) undertakes a 
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similar inquiry based on firm-level data from a survey in Uganda in 1998. Measuring 
uncertainty in the same way as Pattillo (1998), Darku finds a negative relation 
between uncertainty and investment and documents that this effect is stronger among 
firms with more irreversible investment. These studies provide direct evidence of a 
negative effect of perceived uncertainty on investment.  
High uncertainty results in a high risk premium in the required return on 
invested capital, suggesting that African manufacturing firms have high opportunity 
costs of capital. Bigsten and others (1999b) argue that this is indeed the case, 
reporting much higher average returns to capital than among firms in more developed 
countries (see table 3). There is a striking similarity in average investment rates across 
both the African and the European countries considered, but the rates of return on 
capital are much higher in the African countries. The researchers infer from this that 
the cost of capital is relatively high in Africa and maintain that this is consistent with 
a negative effect of uncertainty on investment. Fafchamps and Oostendorp (1999) 
take a similar view by arguing that uncertainty is a plausible explanation for why 
investment remained low in Zimbabwe. 
Using the same data set as in the 1999 study but adding Zambia, Bigsten and 
others (2005) examine whether investment is affected by irreversibility and fixed 
adjustment costs. If so, one would expect to see a significant share of zero 
investments. Combining the information presented by Bigsten and others (2005) and 
that of Reinikka and Svensson (2001) on Uganda, table 4 summarizes the proportions 
of nonzero investments in this data set by country and firm size. With the exception of 
Uganda and Zimbabwe the proportion of positive investment is lower than 0.5 across 
all size categories, meaning that the majority of firms in these categories do not invest 
at all during a typical year. There is a weak positive relationship between firm size 
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and propensity to invest, although among the largest firms in Ghana only one in five 
firms invest in a representative year. Investment activity is generally higher in 
Zimbabwe than in the other countries, although a third of firms in the Zimbabwean 
sample still refrain from investing in a typical year. The researchers also show that 
investment is “lumpy”; whenever firms do invest, they invest a lot. This suggests that 
fixed adjustment costs may be important. However, more formal analyses of the 
decision to invest using a dynamic discrete choice model point to irreversibility as the 
main explanation for low investment in Africa. Reducing uncertainty, or improving 
the market for second-hand fixed capital, is therefore likely to positively affect 
investment.  
{Table 4 about here} 
 
Exports  
 
As mentioned, manufacturing firms in Africa operate in small domestic markets. To 
expand production, firms may have to orient part of their production toward 
exporting. What factors prevent African firms from entering export markets? And are 
there any benefits, other than market enlargement, associated with exporting? In 
particular, is there any evidence that firms become more productive as a result of 
exporting, perhaps because of contacts with foreign customers or exposure to 
international competition? 
At least two key factors determine whether a firm participates in the export 
market: the level of entry barriers, and the firm’s cost efficiency. In an influential 
 26
study of the decision to export, Roberts and Tybout (1997) argue that entering the 
export market for the first time may be associated with a fixed entry cost. For 
instance, the firm may need to set up a marketing department to investigate marketing 
channels and meet export orders. While entry costs are typically not observed, 
Roberts and Tybout argue that state dependence in exports—that lagged participation 
affects the likelihood of current participation—may constitute indirect evidence of 
entry costs. Thus in the absence of entry costs firms will switch in and out of the 
export market independently of whether they have exported in the past. If there are 
significant entry costs, however, firms that have incurred these costs in the past (and 
thus will not have to incur them again) will be more likely to export in subsequent 
periods than firms that have not, because exporting is less costly for insiders than for 
outsiders.  
In testing for state dependence in exports, it is important to recognize the 
possibility that lagged exporting status is not strictly exogenous. In particular, if there 
is unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across firms in the propensity to export, 
failure to control for such heterogeneity will tend to bias the results toward state 
dependence. Roberts and Tybout deal with this issue, often referred to as the initial 
conditions problem, using techniques developed by Heckman (1981). In their 
empirical application, which is based on data on manufacturing plants in Colombia, 
Roberts and Tybout find strong evidence that insiders are more likely to export than 
outsiders. This indicates that entering the export market is associated with significant 
fixed costs.  
Bigsten and others (2004) carry out a similar analysis based on RPED data 
from the early 1990s for Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, and Zimbabwe. Controlling for a 
number of factors, including firm-specific time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, 
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they find that past export status has a significant effect on the propensity to export. 
The magnitude of this effect is large: for the average firm that did some exporting in 
the previous period, the likelihood of exporting in the current period is about 0.57 
while the likelihood of exporting for an otherwise identical firm that did not export in 
the previous period is 0.18. Thus, for a nonexporting firm with the average 
characteristics, entering the export market raises the probability of exporting in the 
next period from less than one in five to more than one in two. This is attributed to 
large entry costs. Van Biesebroeck (2005a) obtains similar results for a larger sample 
of nine Sub-Saharan Africa countries using a similar approach.  
 The second factor that determines whether a firm will export is its cost 
efficiency. Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) derive a model in which exporting is 
associated with a fixed cost that is incurred in every period of exporting. In this model 
firms with marginal costs below some threshold choose to export, while firms with 
marginal costs above the threshold remain focused on the domestic market. Thus, this 
model predicts that relatively efficient firms will self-select into the export market. 
The study by Bigsten and others (2004) looks for evidence of self-selection in export 
markets and finds this effect to be relatively weak. Van Biesebroeck (2005a) finds a 
somewhat stronger self-selection effect in a larger sample. Both studies report results 
suggesting that causality runs in the other direction, from exporting to efficiency.  
The fact that exporters tend to be more efficient than nonexporters is a 
common result in both rich and poor countries. Mengistae and Pattillo (2004) report a 
positive correlation between productivity and exporting among firms in Ethiopia, 
Ghana, and Kenya. Whether this is because exporting actually causes efficiency gains 
has received considerable attention in the literature recently. From a policy 
perspective whether firms in developing countries learn from exporting is an 
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important issue since learning by exporting can reduce the competitiveness gap 
endogenously through increased international trade. One methodological challenge in 
testing for learning by exporting is that exporting will be endogenous if efficient firms 
self-select into the export market: efficiency and exports may be correlated even in 
the absence of learning effects.  
Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) develop an econometric framework for 
teasing out the relative importance of learning effects and self-selection effects. Key 
features of this approach are that exports are determined by efficiency and that there is 
a common unobserved time-invariant factor that affects both the propensity to export 
and firm-level efficiency. Using the econometric framework proposed by Clerides, 
Lach, and Tybout (1998), Bigsten and others (2004) find relatively strong evidence of 
learning effects in that participating in export markets has positive effects on total 
factor productivity in subsequent periods. Van Biesebroeck (2005a) uses similar 
methods and confirms the presence of learning effects. The quantitative effect of 
exporting appears to be large. The estimates reported by Bigsten and others imply that 
exporting is associated with a productivity gain of 7–8 percent in an output production 
function, which corresponds to productivity gains in terms of value added of 20–25 
percent in the short run and up to 50 percent in the long run. These estimates are in 
line with the results reported by Van Biesebroeck (2005a). 
 
Conclusions, Future Research, and Some Thoughts on Policy  
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A decade of surveys in Africa has greatly improved our understanding of the factors 
that drive the choices and outcomes in the manufacturing sector. Four main findings 
emerge from the research.  
First, investment in physical capital has remained low, more because of 
uncertainty than because of a severe credit constraint. There is some evidence that 
lack of credit has been a problem for small firms, but although the profit effect on 
investment is larger for small than for large firms (Reinikka and Svensson 2001), it is 
still quite small. Analysis of firms’ borrowing behavior paints a similar picture: on 
average the desire for formal credit has been relatively modest, although demand for 
credit is relatively high among very small firms. The most likely explanation for why 
a lack of credit has not been a major factor in explaining the low levels of investment 
over the last decade is that few firms could identify strong investment opportunities 
during this period. This does not mean that the financial sector reforms implemented 
in many African countries in the 1990s were unnecessary, but only that the constraints 
that were relaxed were not binding at the time. When firms expand and the need for 
formal borrowing increases, the financial reforms may turn out to have a higher 
payoff.  
Second, exports have remained low throughout the period, and research 
indicates that the high costs of entering the export market may be part of the reason. 
This has two potentially important policy implications. First, if incentives can be 
created for firms to enter the export market, firms are likely to remain in the export 
market for some time. Second, high entry costs imply that there is a large set of firms 
that remain focused on the domestic market even though they are internationally 
competitive. Reducing entry costs will give these firms access to a larger market. 
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Third, evidence is fairly strong that exporting leads to efficiency gains—there 
is learning by exporting. Studies looking at this issue in other regions tend not to 
obtain this result (see Clerides, Lach, and Tybout 1998; but see also Blalock and 
Gertler 2004 for a counter example). One possible explanation is that the potential 
gains from exporting are large in Africa because of high trade restrictions in the past 
and a large technological gap with developed countries. Exporting thus offers 
maximum scope for the increased discipline of competition, and contact with foreign 
customers provides maximum scope for learning opportunities. Arguably, if exporting 
induces efficiency in any environment, it should do so in Africa. This implies that 
Africa may have much to gain from orienting its manufacturing sector toward 
exporting.  
Fourth, there is strong evidence that earnings vary across individuals with 
similar skills and thus that labor costs vary across firms even though the quality of 
labor may be similar. Wages are higher in large firms than in small, but this can be 
attributed only partly to differences in worker characteristics. Why this is so is not 
fully understood, but the effect is quantitatively large.  
Improving our understanding of why these results are observed seems an 
important area for future research. Other issues also need further research. Although 
much has been learned about enterprise growth from the enterprise data, there is still 
uncertainty about the association between enterprise size and growth. It may be that 
growth rates are independent of enterprise size, in which case policymakers should 
not expect systematically higher growth rates in certain size segments of the sector. 
To address some of the methodological challenges discussed, researchers will need to 
use data covering firms over a relatively long period. Access to panel data with a 
reasonably long time dimension is therefore important. Further, whether the fact that 
 31
small and relatively productive firms have high exit rates (Söderbom, Teal, and 
Harding 2006) is a cause for concern depends on why this result is observed. It would 
be socially wasteful if exit were involuntary, due to some uninsurable and temporary 
shock. However, if exit is voluntary, the result of the entrepreneur finding a more 
profitable occupation elsewhere, it is less clear that this is a problem.  
The research results based on the African enterprise data have implications for 
policy. More jobs can be created only if the industrial sector expands. With domestic 
markets still very small, most expansion will probably have to be through exports. 
The survey data indicate that the rewards from participation in international markets 
may be substantial, but also that firms are reluctant to enter the export market because 
of high costs. Facilitating exporting would thus appear an important part of the policy 
package. With poor infrastructure and a weak regulatory system, Africa is at a 
disadvantage, so reforms in these areas would seem important. That good policies can 
make a difference is clear from Madagascar, for instance, where the creation of an 
efficient export processing zone led to a very rapid expansion in the textiles and 
garment sector in the 1990s.  
Further, to be internationally competitive, more investment is needed.12 
Because the survey data support the notion that uncertainty hampers investment, 
sound and credible policies consistently pursued over time should reduce the risk 
perceived by entrepreneurs. Governance is likely to be central, because without good 
governance, uncertainty will persist and investors’ response to other initiatives will be 
weak. Stringing together several years of good governance and good policies can be 
hard in a situation where people do not see quick results, and resisting policy reversals 
and populist policies will therefore be a challenge.  
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In addition, scarce resources—land, skills, physical capital, raw material—
need to be channeled to firms that are productive and in a good position to export. An 
important question is what to do with the large informal manufacturing sector in 
Africa. Based on Kenyan enterprise data, Bigsten, Kimuyu, and Lundvall (2004) 
argue that the informal sector is large primarily because being formal is costly. Thus, 
addressing the basic governance and investment climate issues would help encourage 
entrepreneurs to move from the informal to the formal sector.  
Of course, that shift will not occur over night, and during a transition period 
steps could be taken to improve performance within the informal sector. Enterprise 
data show that some of the key economic fundamentals, such as total factor 
productivity, are reasonably good in informal firms (Bigsten, Kimuyu, and Lundvall 
2004). However, vocational training and other capacity-building efforts have so far 
been directed mainly to the formal sector while largely neglecting the needs of 
informal firms. One likely welfare loss stems from the lack of access to credit, and 
hence forgone investment, for informal firms, because of their ambiguous legal status 
and lack of proper accounts, as well as the lack of credit-rating procedures relevant to 
informal firms. Because of the small absolute size of the loans required by informal 
firms, it should be feasible to support alternative procedures for the provision of 
credit.  
While most African firms have experienced limited success at best, there is 
also a class of firms that have performed very well. This general finding suggests that 
African manufacturing firms have the potential to perform well. To enable firms to 
improve their performance, key goals for African industrial policy should be to 
facilitate the adoption of new technology and the penetration of new markets. 
Countries that cannot break out of the current situation—in which most 
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manufacturing firms focus on supplying the domestic market with low value-added 
products—are unlikely to see a significant expansion of jobs in the manufacturing 
sector or to have manufacturing play a major role in reducing poverty.  
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 Table 1. Formal Credit Market Participation by Firm Size (percent) 
 Micro Small Medium Large All 
  
Did not apply 92 82 80 75 82 
Applied and did not 
receive 
6 11 9 5 8 
Applied and received 2 7 11 20 10 
Source: Bigsten and others 2003 (table 2). 
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 Table 2. Credit Constraints by Firm Size (percent)  
 Micro Small Medium Large All 
No credit demand 33 50 67 66 55 
Demand, but rejecteda 64 42 21 10 33 
Received loan 3 8 12 23 12 
a. Includes firms that suggested that a loan application would be rejected by banks. 
Source: Bigsten and others 2003. 
 46
 Table 3. Investment Rates and Returns on Fixed Capital in Selected African and 
European Countries (percent) 
 Investment rate 
Average return on fixed 
capital 
Africa   
Cameroon 0.11 1.36 
Ghana 0.13 3.63 
Kenya 0.11 1.82 
Uganda 0.12 0.75 
Zimbabwe 0.12 0.85 
Europe   
Belgium 0.13 0.18 
France 0.11 0.12 
Germany  0.12 0.16 
United Kingdom 0.12 0.13 
   
Source: All countries except Uganda, Bigsten and others 1999b; Ugandan, Reinikka 
and Svensson 2001.  
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 Table 4. Proportions of Nonzero Investments among Firms in Five African Countries, 
by Firm Size 
Number of 
Employees 
Cameroon Ghana Kenya Uganda Zambia Zimbabwe
   
1–5 0.21 0.31 0.44 n.a. 0.29 0.53 
   
6–20 0.29 0.44 0.40 n.a. 0.29 0.51 
       
21–100 0.24 0.48 0.41 n.a. 0.28 0.63 
   
101 or more 0.38 0.20 0.44 n.a. 0.38 0.71 
       
Total 0.29 0.32 0.42 0.52 0.31 0.66 
       
Source: Bigsten and others 2005 and Reinikka and Svensson 2001.  
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1 This is not the first study to take stock of what can be learned from data on 
manufacturing firms in Africa. Tybout (2000) reviews the research on firm 
performance in developing regions, including Africa. Mazumdar and Mazaheri (2003) 
focus exclusively on African manufacturing. Collier and Gunning (1999) discuss the 
problems faced by Africa’s manufacturing sector as part of their survey paper on 
Africa’s general economic problems. All of these studies cover data on African firms 
over the period 1991–95, the period covered by the first wave of data from the 
Regional Program on Enterprise Development. More recently, Kingdon, Sandefur, 
and Teal (2004) and Fafchamps and Söderbom (2004) have provided overviews of the 
conditions for job creation and labor demand in Africa, drawing on the firm surveys 
among other sources. This review is based on more recent data than that of Collier 
and Gunning, Tybout, and Mazumdar and Mazaheri, and in looking at a wide range of 
results that have come out of the research on the firm data it has a broader focus than 
the reviews by Kingdon, Sandefur, and Teal and Fafchamps and Söderbom. 
2 For instance, Bigsten et al. (1999b) analyze data on manufacturing firms in 
four African countries and report that profit to capital ratios are more than four times 
lower than the median for one in four firms and more than four times higher than the 
median in one in four firms (and this is not a result primarily of cross-country 
differences). A similar finding of large variability across firms holds for most of the 
key performance variables in the data (productivity, export intensity, investment). 
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3 Investment climate is a very broad concept. Its key components are the 
institutional, policy, and regulatory environment in which firms operate (Dollar, 
Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae 2005). Examples of recently studied dimensions 
of the investment climate include the quality of infrastructure, the nature of business 
regulations and their enforcement, the prevalence of credit constraints, the quality of 
governance, general conditions for private investment and enterprise growth, 
economic freedom, country credit ratings, human development, environmental 
sustainability, and civil rights. 
4 See http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/datasets/main.html. 
5 Enterprise surveys are not the only useful data for analyzing the role of the 
investment climate. In fact, because many aspects of the investment climate are 
constant across firms within an economy, it will sometimes be better to measure the 
key dimensions of the investment climate at the country level—perhaps by means of a 
few case studies—and then to conduct the empirical analysis at the aggregate level. 
One major project based on such a procedure has generated the World Bank and 
International Finance Corporation Doing Business Database (World Bank 2005), 
which contains data on aspects of the regulatory environment facing private firms in a 
large number of countries and economic regions—for example, how long it takes to 
start a business, how hard it is to hire and fire workers, how well contracts are 
enforced, and so on. The construction of these data is based on case studies of laws 
and regulations in each country and does not involve surveying individual firms.  
6 Ghana: exp(0.15ln(40) – 0.15ln(20)) – 1 = 0.11. Kenya: exp(0.08ln(40) – 
0.08ln(20)) – 1 = 0.06. 
7 The idea that efficiency wages drive the wage-size gap is considered by 
Velenchik (1997), but not tested directly. 
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8 See Dollar, Hallward-Driemeier, and Mengistae (2005) for such analysis 
based on firm-level data from Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, and India. 
9 There is also evidence that ethnicity plays a role in whether firms use trade 
credit at all (Fisman 2003). This too may be consistent with information 
imperfections. 
10 In an early study of the relations between minorities and entrepreneurial 
success, Kilby (1983) argues that minority entrepreneurs often have superior initial 
endowments of capital, technology, and knowledge of markets and have acquired 
traditions that help them raise productivity.  
11 One of the main objectives of investment is to get access to better 
technology. Direct transfers of technology through technology contracts and the like 
to African manufacturing firms have been very limited (see, for example, Bigsten and 
Kimuyu 2002, on Kenya).  
12 Currently, foreign investors do not appear to see Africa as a promising 
location for investment, and many Africans share this view and keep a large share of 
their wealth outside Africa (about 40 percent according to Collier, Hoeffler, and 
Pattillo 2001). 
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